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ABSTRACT 
In management and information systems research, there has been a long-standing debate over the relationship between 
technology and the organization in which it is embedded. This debate flares up periodically and this is one such time. At one 
extreme is technological determinism, which makes the claim that technology is the cause and organizational change is the 
effect. At the other extreme is social determinism, which claims that social action and interaction is the cause and 
technological change is the effect. Is there a way out of this debate? How can we make sense of the interactions between 
people and machines? In this paper, we will examine the debate, discuss what is at stake in its resolution and explore an 
alternative. 
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INTRODUCTION 
All academic pursuits are characterized by debate and this is particularly the case for the social and information sciences. 
Often these debates involve thinking about the core concepts and questions of the discipline. For example, philosophers have 
been struggling with the mind/body problem since Descartes threw down the gauntlet. Psychologists periodically return to 
the nature nurture debate. Anthropologists have been thinking about the concept of race as biological or social construction. 
Literary critics have been reflecting on the nature of the meaning of texts, with respect to authorship and intertextuality. 
In management and information systems research, there has been a long-standing debate over the relationship between 
technology and the organization in which it is embedded. This debate flares up periodically and in a recent (2005) special 
issue of the Scandinavian Journal of Information Systems, Rose, Jones and Truex (2005; 134) offer an account of the debate 
and explain its importance, noting that is revolves around “an issue that would seem central to the IS research endeavor, that 
is the relationship between the technical and social aspects of IS.”   A central question concerns the relationship between 
technology and organization and the role played by agency. Rose, Jones and Truex (2005; 134) argue that the debate must be 
revisited “if the IS discipline is to develop a consistent socio-theoretical vocabulary.” Hanseth (2005; 159) concurs and states 
that the relationship between technology and organization “is indeed the very core issue of IS. At the same time -and in spite 
of the long-standing debate - the understanding of this issue within the field is very poor.”  
What is clear is that the debate involves a dualism, the contours of which can be seen at its extremes. At one end of the 
continuum of positions is technological determinism, which makes the claim that technology is the cause and organizational 
change is the effect. At the other is social determinism, which claims that social action and interaction is the cause and 
technological change is the effect. While very few researchers operate at these extremes, Rose, Jones, and Truex (2005; 135) 
suggest that the assumptions of deterministic thinking are more pervasive than might be expected and work their way into the 
debate. They describe two main theoretical paths that researchers in information systems research have taken, argue that these 
paths have been very influential in shaping the current instantiation of the debate and show that the two paths are based on 
incompatible conceptions of agency. 
In the special issue of the journal, five articles were solicited in response to Rose, Jones and Truex’s provocation (Walsham, 
2005; Hanseth, 2005; Holmstrom, 2005; McMaster and Wastell, 2005; Orlikowski, 2005). In this paper, we provide a sixth 
response in which the debate is placed into an historical context, its importance is discussed and an alternative is proposed 
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which attempts to shift the debate from the problem of agency to the consideration of technology as an object with 
materiality. 
ON DUALISMS 
To place this debate into perspective, a digression into the history of sociology is useful. Dualisms have been at the center of 
sociology, a discipline some of whose theories have had significant impact on information systems research, since its 
founding in the late 1800s. Durkheim, one of the early proponents of the field, worked tirelessly to establish sociology as an 
independent academic discipline creating the first department of sociology at the University of Bordeaux in 1895 and 
founding and editing “L’Annee Sociologique,” the discipline’s first journal in 1898. Among his lasting contributions is the 
concept of social facts (Durkheim; 1982), which cannot be reduced to or explained by the actions of individuals; society, in 
this formulation, is always greater than the sum of its parts. Durkheim uses an organic metaphor at the center of his social 
ontology where society is the organism and individuals are cells (Lehmann, 1995; 16). In doing so, he sets up an enduring 
dualism where society and the individual are ontologically distinct. While a political intent of this move was to differentiate 
sociology from psychology, a significant consequence is that the discipline has been struggling with the Durkheim’s legacy 
ever since; this struggle has taken the form of a debate involving questions of the relationship between the society and the 
individual and the appropriate ways for which the dualism can be accounted for theoretically. 
 
Within sociology this dualism has come to be known as the problem of order and has preoccupied many of the major thinkers 
in the discipline during the 20th century. Based on an assumption that the natural condition of humans anarchic, the need for 
society is justified by contrasting it with a “state of nature” where “during the time men live without a common power to 
keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is of every man against every man” 
(Hobbes, 1994; 14). The question then becomes what holds societies together when the natural inclination of humans is to 
pull it apart. For example, macro-sociologists such as Parsons (1968, 1951) try to account for the dualism by positing society 
as a social system and explaining how individuals in the society act in response to changes in the system, typically by 
adopting social roles that fulfill system needs. This form of structural functionalism has been one influential stream of 
theorizing in American sociology. Micro-sociologists such as Blumer (1969) approach the dualism from the starting point of 
the individual, explaining that out of the actions and interactions among individuals, particularly the symbolic interactions 
that are involved in the exchange of language, society emerges. This form of interactionism has been a second influential 
stream of sociological theorizing. Both approaches, however, have limitations that can be traced back to the influence of 
Durkheim’s social ontology. The macro-level explanations offer an interesting conceptualization of society and its structure 
but cannot adequately account for the individual level of social reality. Micro-level theories provide deep and rich insights 
into individual social realities but cannot adequately account for the societal level of social reality.  
 
Challenging the dualism 
 
By the latter half of the 1900s, sociologists seemed to be either aligned with one or the other approach or dissatisfied with 
both and searching for a way to resolve or sidestep the debate. In the 1980s several alternatives emerged that provided 
different ways respond to the impasse that divided the field, two of which have had important consequences for information 
systems research. The first, structuration theory, was developed by Giddens (1979, 1984) in England during the 1980s.  At 
the same time, within science and technology studies, Latour (1987), Callon (1986) and colleagues such as Law (1988) 
developed actor network theory at the Centre de Sociologie de l'Innovation in Paris. The limitations of this paper preclude 
extensive discussion of these approaches; instead the way in which each responds to the Durkheimian dualism will be briefly 
described.  
 
Structuration theory challenges the dualism of society and the individual by rejecting the social ontology in which it is based. 
It places interaction at the center of social reality and reconceptualizes the dualism of individual and society as a duality of 
structure and agency, arguing that both the individual and society are co-constituted in and through social interaction. 
Structuration is an ongoing and taken for granted process within which structure is the outcome of and medium through 
which social interaction takes place. In this approach, structure is a key component of society and is composed of rules and 
resources. During social interaction, these structural components are drawn upon, the effect of which is to enable and 
constrain the interaction. The act of invoking rules and resources during social interaction recreates them, allowing society to 
persist over time. Two types of resources are defined in structuration theory, authoritative resources which, when invoked, 
allow a person to exercise control over other persons, and allocative resources which allow control over material objects. In 
this approach, technology is an example of the latter type of resource. 
 
Actor-network theory also rejects the social ontology on which the dualism is based but offers a different type of approach 
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based on a principle of radical symmetry. In an actor network, all participants have equal status and all can interact within the 
network. As they act and interact they are defining themselves and the other participants and shaping the work and the social 
and technical practices of the network; in the language of actor-network theory, participants are “actants.” In this approach, 
the social and the technical components in the network are intertwined and interdependent. Because of the symmetry of actor 
networks, neither human nor non-human participants are privileged and that both have agency. In this approach, technology 
is a participant in a network and therefore has agency. 
 
Revisiting the debate  
 
In their description of the debate, Rose, Jones and Truex (2005a) describe the relationship between technology and 
organization as involving a dualism that echoes the legacy of Durkheim. They label the poles of this dualism technological 
and social determinisms; in the former, they (2005; 134) explain, “technology causes changes (technology effects) in an 
organization which is apparently powerless to resist them” and in the latter, “technology is solely portrayed as the product of 
human intentions, designs and actions.” Admitting that IS researchers have not gravitated towards these poles, they (2005; 
135) find that the two main theories imported into information systems research by those seeking to find a path between the 
two determinisms come from sociology: 
 
 “[i]nitial interest (in the community of IS researchers with their theoretical roots in social theory) was focused around 
Giddens’ structuration theory (ST) (Giddens 1984)” [while more] recently actor network theory (ANT) (Latour 1987) has 
attracted increasing attention.” 
 
These two theories have shaped the dualism of technology and organization, sharing an appreciation for social interaction and 
a distaste for determinisms. However, they offer two different conceptions of technology that cannot be easily (if at all) 
reconciled. In structuration theory, technology is an allocative resource that is essentially passive until such time as it is 
invoked during social interaction, when it becomes a tool that can be used by a person who attempts to bring about a change 
in a state of affairs or intervene in an ongoing flow of action. Because it us a structural resource, technology cannot have 
agency – only people can act. In contrast, in actor-network theory, technology is an actant in the network and has agency. 
Actor-networks are by definition, heterogeneous, so there can be a range of actions brought about by human and non-human 
participants, including technologies.  
The implication here is that there are two incompatible conceptions of technology that differ on the extent to which 
technology has agency. In information systems research, the problem of order has been transformed into a problem of 
agency. Structuration theory falls short because it does not adequately account for technology except as a resource to be 
called upon during social interaction. Actor network theory falls short because it elevates the importance of technology as a 
non-human participant in a network but does not make clear the nature of its agency.  
TECHNOLOGY AS OBJECT 
The question of the agency of humans seems to be non-controversial except for those taking an extreme technologically 
determinist position. The rest of us accept the individual’s agency and can decompose it into a collection of characteristics 
and potentials such as motivation, intentionality, ability to exercise power, etc. For example, Giere (2004: 762) argues that 
 
… human agents are conscious of things in their environment and self-conscious of themselves as actors in their 
environment. Agents have beliefs about themselves and their environments. They may justifiably claim to know some 
things and not other things. Agents are capable of making plans and some times intentionally carrying them out. Agents are 
also responsible for their actions according to the standards of the culture and local communities … 
 
To think about the agency of technology it is helpful to think about technology as an object and a material artifact. This raises 
issues of the relationship between materiality and the social. If agency is not limited to humans, in what sense can non-human 
entities be considered actors? Can they act? If so, in what sense can they be said to act? How does the agency of technology 
compare to the agency of humans? Are human and non-human forms of agency symmetrical? Equivalent? 
 
The move to focus on technology as an object is not new. Orlikowski and Iacono (2001, 121; 134) state that 
 
The field of information systems, which is premised on the centrality of information technology in everyday life, has not 
deeply engaged its core subject matter – the information technology artifact” 
The tendency to take IT artifacts for granted in IS studies has limited our abilities as researchers to understand many of 
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their critical implications – both intended and unintended – for individuals, groups, organizations, and society 
 
Two questions can be posed to begin an exploration of technology as an object. What happens if technology is considered a 
material object in a social world? What is the role of technology as a material object? 
 
Harre (2002) explores the notion of technology as a material object that stands in some relationship to a social world. As an 
object, technology is a non-living entity that occupies space and time. To be useful it must be embedded in a social world at 
which point it becomes capable of interacting with human beings in positive and negative and enabling and constraining 
ways. Some material things are passive in relation to people while other things are active. Whether something is passive or 
active largely depends on the social narrative in which it is embedded. As objects, technologies can carry meanings, have 
significant roles to play on action, change over time, and help and hinder action (Harre 2002, 25, 26). 
 
There are three main ways that technology as a material object becomes bound up in social narratives and therefore, the 
social world. The first is the task tool discourse where the narrative specifies the task and determines the category of the 
object to serve as a tool. Depending on the nature of the discourse, a compute can be a tool for empowerment or for 
surveillance and control. The second involves established conventions where social norms specify the uses and meanings of 
objects. The third involves informal customs where social practices specify the uses and meaning of objects. It is possible for 
"a material thing identified by its material attributes to exist as more than one social object, each identified by its role in a 
narrative" (Harre, 2002; 27). 
 
Pels, Hetherington, and Vandenberghe, (2002; 8) argue that material objects, including technological artifacts, play an 
important role in the performance of the social world as “active mediators, ‘fixers’ and stabilizers of social, cultural and 
political networks.” This leads them to a position that technology has agency - constitutive effects within entangled networks 
of sociality and materiality where “materials are not things given meaning by a volitional will but are taken as ‘actants’; their 
agency is understood as constituted as a relational and non-volitional ‘will-as-force’.” 
 
Day and Ma (2009) offer an approach to the technological artifact that allows it to be rethought through a critical lens 
informed by Heidegger’s (1977) reflections on the question of technology. Their analysis is motivated by the insight 
 
…that social analysis is often viewed in causal terms borrowed from physics—that is, causation understood as the 
determinate force exerted by one body upon another, and as such, ‘users’ making use of technologies to ‘effect’ resulting 
products, technology’s ‘effects’ upon society, and so forth—is there a way of rethinking social causation in other terms 
than causes and effects? 
 
They begin with “techne” or the art or craft by which a thing comes into appearance and argue that the causes that are 
responsible for the emergence of the thing should be seen as non-teleological and interdependent. The Aristotelian causes 
(formal, material, efficient, and formal) are “as mutually important, co-responsible affordances to which the emergent thing 
is indebted” (Day and Ma, 2009; 2). This implies that technological objects are “indebted” to assemblages of socio-cultural, 
material, and labor affordances and are social, technical, and cultural expressions of these affordances. This way of thinking 
about technological objects re-establishes the importance of situated action into the processes by which objects are produced 
and used. This has implications for how the technological artifact is studied because (Day and Ma, 2009; 3) 
 
1) production is re-understood culturally-socially, and 2) social events are understood in terms of mutual affordances, 
rather than as determinate forces or causes of agents acting upon one another and upon objects or vice versa. This affects 
modern technological and technical studies in that techne is understood to underlie both.  Both technique and technology in 
[IS] are cultural-social in nature, being made up of actions and parts arranged and used for producing meaningful acts and 
products. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The debate over the relationship between technology and organization is important in information systems research because it 
encourages rethinking of conventional approaches to the nature of the technological artifact that is at the core of the 
discipline. Rose, Jones and Truex (2005a, 2005b) and their respondents have provided a useful service by foregrounding the 
debate and recasting it in terms of the problem of agency. This paper attempts to clear some brush in order to more clearly 
survey the ground on which the debate takes place. In doing so, the dualism underlying the debate has been placed in a larger 
intellectual context drawn from the history of sociology allowing a clearer understanding of the ways in which the two main 
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theoretical approaches imported from that field into information systems research, structuration theory and actor network 
theory, have shaped the debate.  
 
Agreeing with Rose, Jones, and Truex that the problem of agency is important to the debate, we argued that to understand the 
problem of agency, it is necessary to return to the object or the technological artifact. Finally, considering the materiality of 
technology, the paper presents a reading of the technological artifact through a critical lens informed by Heidegger to 
conclude that technological objects are forms for social and cultural expression and emergence. The question then arises 
about what to do next.  
 
One path to follow is to consider more closely and more critically the ways in which the insertion of the materiality of 
technology changes the contours of the debate, particularly with respect to the question of agency as seen in the versions of 
structuration and actor-network theories that have been most popular in information systems research. This might involve a 
critical examination of the assumptions of these approaches. How realistic are they? How might they be tested? A second 
path to follow is to use the materiality of technology as a lens to critically examine the conceptions of organization that both 
approaches seem to take for granted. How might the debate turn with a conception of organization that assumes that it is a 
sociotechnical phenomenon constituted and reconstituted out of the interactions of technology and the people who design, 
implement and use it? Both paths are beyond the scope of this paper and represent future directions for reflection and 
analysis. 
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